

CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL



Published in Accordance with
General Statutes Section 51-216a

VOL. LXXIX No. 42

April 17, 2018

403 Pages

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CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL

(ISSN 87500973)

Published by the State of Connecticut in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 51-216a.

Commission on Official Legal Publications
Office of Production and Distribution
111 Phoenix Avenue, Enfield, Connecticut 06082-4453
Tel. (860) 741-3027, FAX (860) 745-2178
www.jud.ct.gov

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Published Weekly – Available at <http://www.jud.ct.gov/lawjournal>

Syllabuses and Indices of court opinions by
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Tel. (860) 757-2250

The deadline for material to be published in the Connecticut Law Journal is Wednesday at noon for publication on the Tuesday six days later. When a holiday falls within the six day period, the deadline will be noon on Tuesday.

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